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NAMIBIA ECONOMY
The Colonial Political Economy in (Terminal?) Crisis
1981 was a disastrous year for the Namibian territorial economy 
with a probably drop in constant price gross territorial product 
(GTP) of 10% following a 1980 decline of 1% and 1979 fall of 7^%.^
1982 is likely to show a further decline of at least 7^% for a 
cummulative collapse of over one-third in constant price GTP.
Because terms of trade movements have also been adverse over 
1980-82, while exports account for about 70% of production, and 
imports for about the same share of domestic expenditure, and 
population has risen about 10%, the true 1978-82 per capita decline 
in territorial command over resource out of territorial production 
is a stunning 45 to 50%.
The late colonial political economy has gone stale and sour with
a vengeance. Given both its naked exploitativeness - characterised
2
as "The Political Economy of Theft" in several recent analyses
and the lack of initiative or self-confidence in restoring it among
3
its political masters, the appropriate epitaph may well be from 
T.S.Eliot's "Hollow Men" - "Here we go round the prickly pear, 
prickly pear, prickly pear ... at six o'clock in the morning ... 
this is the way the world ends, not with a bang but a whimper." The 
causes of the collapse are partly external lying in the global 
economic crisis, the general economic weakness of Sub-Saharan Africa 
including for this purpose South Africa, and drought. But they are 
also related to the contradictions always latent in the colonial
4
system - particularly its single male "contract" labour system 
- which have now become explosively antagonistic. The cost 
of Namibia in economic terms now far exceeds the gains to 
R S A , the cost of continued war is not seen as having a positive 
payoff by many major investors (whatever their views of
;SWAPO) - this Humpty Dumpty cannot be put together again by all 
Piet Wappen B o t h a ’s horses5 and men.
Contract Built - Will it Destroy?6
The "contract" labour system allowed (and still allows) employers 
to pay lower than family subsistence wages because the contract 
employee's family remain in a homeland/reserve and scratch some food 
and shelter (not full subsistence) there. For the ranching sector 
low wages have always been essential; for the smaller mines and 
fishing industry they were critical, at least in the past. Thus 
cheap labour made available by land theft and housed in compounds 
for term contract was the foundation on which the colonial political 
economy was built. Today, however, it is contract - or rather the 
process of "breaking contract" - which is fatally eroding that 
political economic system.
This is not a matter simply of perceived grievances or exploitation, 
but of quite definite impacts on the structure of Namibian conscious­
ness and organisation. First, it has created a sense of nationhood 
by bringing together people from different communities and areas at 
workplaces and in compounds. Second, by forcing households to keep 
one foot in the reserve and one in the compound it has built an 
organic worker-peasant unity. Third, the isolated compounds have 
given time, space and privacy for SWAPO to organise. Fourth, 
forcing women to act as head of households has contributed a high 
degree of self-organisation and activism among Namibian women.
These are the characteristics that have made internal SWAPO impos­
sible to break as a political consciousness force, external SWAPO 
a credible political mobiliser internationally and PLAN a dangerous 
and debilitating military opponent.
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Drought and W a r : Dustlands on the Veldt
Agricultural output has fallen sharply. Settler cattle stocks may 
well be down to little over 1,000,000 head or half their mid 1970's
g
levels. While the early months of 1982 saw some break in the 
drought, this was by no means general, and many ranches now have 
had no significant rainfall for three to five years.
While prices and RSA quotas for beef have been reasonably good 
over 1980-1981, they do not offset the fact that under drought 
conditions the ranchers are living on capital, not income - reducing 
stock nor sustaining it. For the case of karakul prices have been
9
poor, forcing reinstitution of subsidies. It seem likely that on 
proceeds of sales alone, the European ranching sector had a severe 
loss in 1980 and even more so in 1981, with 1982 probably as bad, 
or worse. Official marketing sources suggest falls of up to 2,000 
of 10-12,000 registered livestock and crop sellers."0 Populación 
data show sharp falls in total European population.
The European ranching system in Namibia was not built purely as an 
economic instrument but also to provide a series of European "strong 
points" and a total number of rural European households to hold the
territory. Therefore, a fall in the number of ranchers has been
seen as unwelcome - especially when the northern and north central 
ranching areas were becoming the locus for PLAN attacks on roads 
and power lines as well as ranches."^ Therefore, over 1980-82 
subsidies - including a R2,000 allowance for living on a ranch quite 
overtly justified on security grounds - totally about R50-60 m  
(R 10,000 per ranch) a year have been introduced.
The subsidies have not stopped a slow but fairly steady stepping up
of guerilla operations - including a major spring 1982 series of
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attacks in the Outjo-Grootfontein-Tsumeb triangle now called even
in the RSA press "The triangle of death". This operation - like
13earlier sabotage at the Windhoek power station - coincided 
(presumably deliberately) with major South African incursions into 
Anogla and claims that SWAPO/PLAN had been wiped out. These claims 
presumably ring as hollow to ranchers as to Namibians, since they 
have been made at half-yearly or shorter intervals for at least 
five years, while the RSA military involvement has risen to R600 
to 1,000 million and 100,000 security personnel (including locally 
recruited and mercenary units) and the PLAN attacks and sabotage 
have also risen.
Depression - Global and Local
The world depression has affected South Africa's economy severely 
- high interests rates have shattered the gold and diamond booms.
As a territory subject to South African inflation rates, monetary 
policies and exchange control, this necessarily affects Namibia 
regatively. Indeed, even the DTA leadership now queries the value
14of unified monetary and fiscal policy for Namibia and South Africa.
In fact, in 1981 and 1982 the world economic depression has hit
Namibia directly. The 50% cutback in diamond production from
2,000,000 carats in the late 1970's to probably 1,000,000 in 1 9 8 2 ^
is the most extreme example and one which has wreaked havoc on the
territorial b u d g e t . ^  On the whole RTZ has been able to hold its
uranium oxide price constrant because of multi-year contracts, but
the same has not been true of the copper, lead, zinc and other
base metal mines. Several of the smaller have closed and the 1980-81
17reopening of Otjihase seems to have been based on its special 
value to Tsumeb's smelting facilities, to an unduly optimistic view 
of the 1981-82 copper price and to tax gains to Tsumeb from acquiring
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Otjihose's accrued losses.
While 1981 may have seen a marginal rise in fish catch, the 
overall situation remains bleak. Only 2 of 10 tinneries appear to 
remain in production and employment in the sector has apparently 
dropped by three-quarters.
Loss of Confidence
In 1980 the newly revised and updated official economic statistics
19were received with some enthusiasm albeit also with caution centred
in the poor 1979 performance.^0 By 1981 the overall situation had
become one of lack of confidence. The only substantial private
investments over 1979-81 were in recommissioning Otjihose, building
additional abbatoir facilities and CDM's prestige office tower in
Windhoek to demonstrate its confidence that de Beers would remain,
21whatever governments fell or rose. While 1980-81 planning
approaches appeared to show a private sector construction boom, this
22was not reflected in overall investment totals.
23 24The Rand Daily Mail and Windhoek Observer were not alone in
criticising the colonial political economy and suggesting that its
25problems were terminal. Tgey were joined by DTA supporters and
even "Chief Minister" Dirk Mudge who kept harping on his belief
South Africa would sell out the settlers and the European firms -
2 6either to protect mining profits, or to achieve a Cuban forces
27withdrawal from Angola, depending on his mood.
The gloom was, if anything, enhanced by a belief that South Africa 
was - throughout 1981 and early 1982 - not negotiating to settle 
arrangements for a transition to independence but to use up time 
and to try to come up with an option less unsatisfactory than a
18
Zimbabwe election rerun. This uncertainty as to an emergence into
a new period and continuation of a decaying present seemed likely
to ensure negligible new investment and substantial loss of output
2 8and employment during 1982.
National Accounts
From having no up-to-date, detailed, published national accounts
29
as of 1980, Namibia moved to having two sets - one official and one 
"counter official"^0 in 1981. Surprisingly their totals are 
relatively similar indicating inter alia that previous South African 
assertions on output, exports and budgetary revenue have been 
serious understatements.
Official 1979 Gross Domestic Product figures at current prices 
totalled R l , 191 million Cover Rl,250 per capita on official population 
estimates). However, the official estimate excludes Walvis Bay 
(a subtantial portion of trade, transport and manufacturing and the 
bulk of fishing) and production carried out and consumed by the 
same unit (ie subsistence plus agricultural wages in ki nd ).
Including these (at R150 million for subsistence) suggests an 
adjusted total of Rl,366 million. The detailed unofficial estimate 
for the same year - Rl,425 million - is about 4% higher, well within 
the range of error of African GDP estimates.
What the 1979 official figures do reveal is a tendency in unofficial 
estimates to overstate agriculture (under;-recognition of drought 
declines) and mining (underestimate of 1977-79 15% decline in dimao 
diamond output) and to underestimate transport and communication.
The primary - secondary - tertiary sector division of the 
(adjusted) official figures is: R689 (740) million, R108 (148) m i l l i o n , 
R394 (479) million. The unofficial are R850 million, R 150 million, 
R425 million.
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National income distribution data conflict fairly sharply for 1979, 
with the official series showing R470 million wages salaries and 
R29 million household property incomes, and the unofficial R390 
million wages and salaries and RllO million household property 
incomes from ranches and small businesses. Official corporate 
savings plus remittances estimates total R438 million - unofficial 
R700 million. The official household proprety income data are 
clearly wrong (by comparison with other years in the official series) 
probably with wages too high. Similarly, remittances abroad are 
virtually defined as corporate dividends ignoring small proprietor 
and salary earner transfers. The corporate profit share of 40% of 
Net Domestic Product post tax and almost 55% pre tax is below some 
previous estimates, but still among the highest shares in the world. 
Of it,at least R300-325 million pre tax (of R615 total) relates to 
Consolidated Diamond Mines and Rossing Uranium. By 1981 it appears 
likely that the total from these two companies had fallen to
perhaps R225 million with Rossing possibly accounting for slightly
U 14T 31 over half.
Investment, Capital Stock and Stagnation
Gross fixed investment at current prices stand at R420 million (32% 
of GTP) in 1 9 8 0 ^ ,  but probably declined to under R400 million (31%) 
in 1981. In 1975 it had been R326.5 million (56%).
33
Given the probably rise in investment unit costs of 20-25% in 1980, 
even the 1980 figure represents no real increase over 1979 despite a 
a 23% nominal rise. Deflated to 1975 prices, 1980 investment would 
be of the order of £200 m, or 40% below that year's level. The 
mid 1970's investment surge which laid the foundations for the 
decadeis output growth has not been sustained.
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The makeup of investment has shifted with general government rising 
from 30% in 1975 to over 40% in 1980. A substantial portion of this 
in 1980 represents "bantusan infrastructure" ie, administration 
buildings and functionary residences whose value may be thought to 
be open to question. 1981 probably saw a decline in the government 
share as revenue collapse and subsidy explosion forced a cutback in 
capital spending which continued through 1982.
34A supposed private sector building boom does not really show up in 
the accounts - even if it does in Windhoek and other urban building 
plan approvals and completions - because the latter cover only 
about 4% of total fixed investment. Private sector investment 
growth in 1980 was dominated by the reactivation of Otjihose mine, 
and by completion of additional abbatoir and cold-store capacity - 
the first not likely to have had a comparable impact in 1981 and 
neither in 1982.
Capital stock estimates (on an historic cost less depreciation
35basis) exist for some sectors : Government Rl,300 million; Mining
3 6£570 million, Electricity, Water, Agriculture and Fishing R225
million each, Manufacturing R56 million at the end of 1980. A
roughly comparable estimate for transport (excluding roads which
37are included in general government) would be R250-275 million
The agriculture estimate at under R40,000 per ranch at first sight
appears compared to average investment per ranch (excluding land)
estimates of R100,000 odd. However, normal karakul, cattle and
3 8other herds are worth in the order of R225-275 million, which 
would adjust the sectoral figure for agriculture (excluding fishing) 
to perhaps R450 million or over R80,000 per ranch. The fishing 
and manufacturing figures are rendered nearly useless by the ex­
clusion of Walvis Bay, which is the site of the bulk of the fish
tinneries and the base for most vessels, as well as the location 
of a major meat packing plant, a substantial portion of heavy 
industry.
Prices; Scissors and Paste 
39Price data for Namibia remain weak. The Windhoek Consumer Price 
Index showed a near 15% increase in 1981 over 1980 with a speeding 
up in the fourth quarter. The increase for food was over 25%. Over 
1976-81 the cummulative increase was 82% overall and 110% for food.
40
The implicit GTP deflator was 19.2% in 1979, 12.6% in 1980 and 
will probably be about 7.5% in 1981 and 1982. The fall, however, 
relates not to lower growth of prices or costs in Namibia, but to 
falls in base metal, uranium oxide and karakul export prices after 
1980 and to a halt in the sharp 1979-80 rises in beef and diamond 
export prices. Thus it represents a real loss of .Namibian command 
over real resources, since import prices have continued to rise 
rapidly. The economy - like that of RSA and almost all of those of 
independent Sub-Saharan Africa - is caught in a price scissors.
Some of the sectoral data appear rather shaky, eg mining's physical 
output index decline in 1979 and 1980 when Rossing was moving to 
capacity is unlikely, despite the known declines in base metal 
production (in response to negative price trends) and in diamond 
output (related to overall de Beers policy and perhaps to worsening 
of recovery rates at Consolidated Diamond Mi ne s). This suggests 
an index number problem and a modest understatement of growth of 
constant price GTP, but not one which would alter the 1979 or 1981 
and 1982 sharp declines in real output.
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External Account - Into Imbalance
Namibian external account data remain highly inaccurate despite
41new official estimates because of the lack of a separate customs, 
services transactions or currency area in terms of statistical 
reporting - much less controls - from South Africa.
Exports in 1980 were of the order of R l ,050-1,075 million and
42
imports R800-850 million (including estimates for Walvis Bay)
giving a positive trade balance of R250 million. This is not
43directly comparable to official estimates partly because it 
treats taxes collected by South Africa (excise and import duty) on 
goods sold to Namibia as an import cost and a South African transfer 
to "SWA/Namibia". Similarly, Walvis Bay part services are treated 
as "net payments for non-factor services" to RSA or deducted from 
export value. Correcting for these differences would raise the 
trade surplus to the order of R300-325 million for 1980 and 
R400-450 for 1979. The latter is above the unofficial estimate 
for that year because imports were lower; the 1980 decline in surplus 
results from an import surge.
Statistical return based remittance and capital account data remain
44unavailable. Net factor payments at R245 million for 1979 and 
Rl85 million for 1980 is a signficánt underestimate as it includes 
only dividends and some debt interest, leaving out both part of 
interest and all the remittances of unincorporated businesses (sole 
proprietors and partners) and employees. These would probably raise 
the total to R350 million for 1979 and R275 million for 1980, 
somewhat below earlier unofficial estimates, but still of the order 
of 30% of GTP in 1979, and nearly 25% in 1980, both of which were 
bad years for the territorial economy.
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Public Finance: Historie Surpluses and Current Collapse
Nowhere are the new official data more revealing than in respect
to public finance. They put paid to the contention that historically
SWA/Namibia has been subsidised on recurrent account by South Africa
and go further than even the harshest critics of the official data
in showing that over 1970-1979 virtually all capital expenditure
by the government was also met from Namibian resources, not external
45(RSA or other) loans or grants.
The situation has worsened substantially in 1981 and 1982 for three
reasons: first, the cost of the war and drought has led to massive
subsidy payments to agriculture (of the order of R55 million, or
10,000 per European r a n c h ) s e c o n d ,  the attempt to buy a clientele
for DTA has led to major expenditure on "bantustan" personnel
salaries, houses and amenities; third, a substantial portion of
South African police and armed forces expenditure in "SWA/Namibia"
47was transferred from RSA to Territorial Budget. As a direct 
result, the budget plunged into deficit on recurrent account in the 
íirst half of 1981 (a virtually unprecedented situation for the 
post-1950 period) and has probably either remained there or 
recovered to a small surplus on the basis of RSA matching grants 
for police and military expenditure.
The position has been compounded by the collapse of revenue - down
almost 20% in the first half of 1981 and probably about the same
4 8(excluding RSA transfers) for the calendar year, with a further
though lesser decline in 1982. This decline relates to the collapse
4 9of profits by CDM in the present period of almost 75% diamond 
production cutbacks (the global cuts by de Beers have been weighted 
heavily against Namibian production), the negative profits of the 
base metal sector and the continued tax exemption of the highly
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profitable — £54.4 million in ly80 and £63 million in 1981 - Rossing
50Uranium
51In 1980 general government current income totalled R428 million,
recurrent consumption expenditure R216 million, subsidies and
domestic transfers R39 million for a surplus of R172.6 million (or
R181.6 million on a cash flow basis, taking account of depreciation
provisions). Of this, R40 million nominally represented RSA grants
and R20 million was South African Railways and Posts and Tele-
5 2communications Investment. Total domestically generated surplus 
was therefore at least R121.5 million, or 64% of investment of 190 
million. Very few governments - especially in developing economies - 
finance 64% of capital spending from recurrent surplus. (RSA is 
not among them.)
The increase in bank deposits during 1980 - despite significant
53capital flight - was of the order of R120 million and that for 
54currency perhaps R25 million. Given a separate Namibian banking 
system, these magnitudes suggest at least R50 million could 
reasonably have been raised domestically from these sources while 
a provident fund at 10% of wages and salaries up to R3,000 per year 
would have yielded perhaps R25 million. Thus for 1980 - a high 
investment, poor economic performance year, 100% domestic financing 
would have been both feasible and prudent, even ignoring the 
possibilities of raising the very low corporate and personal income 
tax and excise rates.
Over 1970-80 total government investment totalled about Rl,090
million. Cash flow surplus on recurrent account was of the order of
55£1,100 million. Adjusting for RSA grants not clearly representing 
transfers of specific Namibian revenue collected by RSA (in some
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years a negative figure) and railways, posts and telecommunications, 
water investment transfers the domestic recurrent surplus was at 
least of the order of R800 million, or 72.5. of total investment.
In 1981 recurrent consumption expenditure was probably of the order
of R330 million, an increase of R15 million over 1980 - about R50-60
million police and military previously on the RSA books. Domestic
subsidies and current transfers were of the order of R75 million,
an increase of R35 million. Revenue may well have exceeded R400
million, but only because of an increase in RSA grants (partly to
offset the military/police bill) and a recalculation of the basis
, 56of customs and excise tax payments to Namibia on her imports. 
Domestic revenue, narrowly defined, fell from about R330 million to 
perhaps R210 million or by almost one-third, basically as a result 
of the fall in diamond mining profits and output. Mid 1981 capital 
budget cutbacks probably held 1981 fiscal investment to R170 million 
(down 10% in nominal and up to 25-30% in real terms on 1980) and 
resulted in further cuts in 1982 as old projects were completed 
without new being started.
The 1981/82 fiscal year budget was expected to show a deterioration
with RSA loans and grants (excluding R134 million compensation for
transfered defence and police functions totalling R240 million, and
57total spending to reach R840 million. In the event, spending
seems to have been held to under R800 million - largely by draconic
intrayear cutbacks on the investment budget - with South African
loans and grants R220-230 million, uncovered deficit R30 million,
5 8and revenue R515 million (including customs and excise share).
59The 1982/83 budget is set at R870 million - a decline in real 
terms on 1981/82 actuals, given the probable rate of inflation - of
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which R210 million is estimated as territorial revenue collections, 
R250 million the SWA/Namibia share of customs and excise, R200 
million RSA grants, R180 million RSA underwritten loans and R30 
million residual deficit. These projections show continued falls 
in the receipts - down to R35 million for diamonds and de facto 
nil on the balance of the mining sector.
These data suggest that the makeup of Prime Minister Botha's
assertion that South Africa is providing a R600 million subsidy to
Namibia60 is grants R2000 million, Namibia/SWA bank borrowing and
loans underwritten R180 million, customs and excise transfers R250
61million. His subsequently cited subsidy of R1000 million apparen­
tly includes R400 million military spending (in addition to the R150 
odd included in the basic territorial fiscal arrangements as of 
1981/82 with the creation of the 'SWA Defence F o r c e 1) . With total 
RSA defence and security expenditure directly identifiable in the 
1982/83 budget comes to R4,270 million (of which R2,690 defence 
proper) the R400 million seems too low with R750-l,000 million a 
more likely estimate of RSA defence costs attributable to the 
occupation of Namibia and related Angolan adventures.
On that basis the gross annual cost of Namibia to RSA is R950-l,250 
million (excluding repayable loans and the customs/excise pool 
agreement). This is significantly above any plausible estimate of 
the value of South African earnings in, exports to, and remittances 
from the occupied territory. SWAPO has succeeded - with help from 
drought and world recession - in one key military-economic objective 
the colonial political economy of Namibia no longer pays, viewed 
from a South African state or territorial economy perspective.
-  15 -
The Political Economy of SWAPO
South African estimates give SWAPO a military budget of R100 million 
(90% said to come from Warsaw Pact members, China, Yugoslavia and 
Cuba) and a civil budget of about the same size (70% from capitalist
r a
industrial economies and UN agencies). These figures are inter­
esting, partly as general orders of magnitude (especially on the civil 
side they may well be underestimates) but more particularly in 
demonstrating that even hostile observers assess SWAPO's civil 
government expenditure as of the same order of magnitude as military 
and its overall external funding sources as highly diversified.
SWAPO's political economic activity has four facets: military (to 
thwart the colonial political economy), refugee and normal civilian 
(services to camp residents and in semi-liberated zones), education 
directed to personpower development for independence, strategic 
planning toward an independent Namibia.
The c a m p s ^  - especially in Zambia - have a broad range of basic 
services with concentration on health, nursery and primary education. 
District problems exist in respect both to water supply and to 
increasing self-sufficiency in food production. These problems have 
been exacerbated by the new surge of refugees following South 
Africa's imposition of conscription on African Namibians, and by 
the successive South African incursions into Angola over the past 
four years, which have forced relocation of refugee centres much 
further north in Angola to reduce the risks of further massacres 
like that at Kassinga.
SWAPO's personpower development programme appears to have covered 
up to 3,000 secondary and tertiary students (including ones who 
have completed their courses). It is broadly related to estimated
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middle and higher-level personnel requirements, but apparently in 
a relatively loose sense, as at no level do cadres in training 
appear to be adequate in numbers, and priorities among different 
types of training do not seem to have been set very clearly.
Pre-independence planning has - perhaps logically - laid heavy stress
on collecting data and advisory views, with SWAPO fairly careful
not to lay down a detailed series of policy decisions and dates
6 6relating to its Programme. Several UNIN and UN Conferences and
6 7quasi-academic volumes have broadened the material and proposals 
available.
6 8SWAPO1s own volume To Be Born A Nation describes and criticises 
the existing colonial political economy. It is much more circum­
spect in making detailed proposals. Its main planning discussions 
on health and education demonstrate serious thinking, but on the 
most sensitive issues - eg land reform, mining control - on which 
premature policy disclosure could increase problems of implementation 
- it does not go significantly beyond the Programme.
fi QDuring 1981-82 several SWAPO leaders including President Sam Nujoma 
and Administrative Secretary Moses G a r o e b S t r e s s e d  that SWAPO did not 
see instant socialism or instant expulsion of foreign firms as either 
practicable or desirable.
"The claim that we would do so is an exercise aimed at giving SWAPO
a bad name ... we know that we will have to be extremely pragmatic
in our approach ... like Mr Mugabe in Zimbabwe we want a radical
71
economic transformation without disrupting production. "
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Both land reform (to reduce the 85% of useable land in white hands)
and renegotiation of constraints with TNC's "new agreements with an
independent Namibian government based on mutual interest and mutual 
72benefit" were stressed.
Gross domestic product by kind of economic activity 
at constant 1975 prices1 
R millions
GDP at 
lacior 
cost
Agriculture 
and fishing
Mining and 
quarrying Manufacturing
Electricity 
and water
Construction
(contractors)
Wholesale and 
iclaii Hade, 
catering and 
accommodation
Transport and 
communi­
cation'
Finance. 
Insurance 
teal estate and 
business services
Community, 
social and 
personal 
services'
General
government
Other
producers
1970 508.7
i
92,5 147.8 28,3 4.8 27,4 46,2 38,7 44,4 8.0 53,7 16,9
1971 515.9.' . 98,1 139,3 23.0 5.5 32,6 49,2 41.2 45,9 8,5 54,7 17.9
1972 523.5 '* 97,5 139,7 24,0 7,0 27.7 49,8 42,9 48.9 8,9 58.7 18.4
1973 524.1 < 78,9 160,7 25,5 7,5 21,9 52,0 38,1 52,8 9.0 58.4 19.3
1974 530,7 83,7 154,6 30,6 6.3 22,7 54,4 38,3 51.5 10,0 58,9 19.7
1975 584.1 111,5 162,7 32,6 7,8 26,5 60,4 38,0 55,61 10.1 58,1 20.8
1976 593.0 114,9 165.7 32,3 7.6 24,9 59,8 37,7 55,6 10.4 61,0 23.1
1977 618,1 97,0 201,2 32,1 8,9 .* 25,5 58,2 40,7 57.7 -11,0 63,4 22.4
1978 699,6 83,5 283,4 35,0 8.2 22,9 53,7 46,6 59,7 11.1 73,5 22,0
1979 647,4 79.4 235,4 34.7 9,2 21.4 51,7 52.8 56.7 10,8 73,9 21.4
1980 640.7 78,4 227,4 32,4 11.2 18,3 55,1 51.3 60,4 10,4 74,5 21.0
Gross domestic product by kind of economic activity 
a t current prices 
R million
GDP al 
tactor 
COSI
Agrlculluie 
and llshing
Mining and 
quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity 
and water
Construction
(contractors)
Wholesale and 
retail trade, 
catering and 
accommodation
Transport and 
communi­
cation
Finance, insurance 
real estate and 
business services
Community, social 
and personal 
services
General
government
Other
producers
1970 320.8 49,7 105,1 15,6 3.5 14,3 32,8 25.7 27.4 5,6 30,6 10,5
1971 327.2 56.0 85,9 14.0 4.3 17,4 35,0 29,5 31,0 6,2 35,9 12 ,0
1972 391,8 66,9 116,9 17.7 5,8 17,6 37,9 31,4 36,3 6,8 41.1 13.4
1973
1
504.9 76,4 187,0 25,8 6.6 18,0 45,3 32,9 42,6 7,5 47,0 15,8
1974 524.9 87,7 164,4 30,5 5.8 21,1 52,5 34,5 48,2 9.0 53.6 17.6
1975 584,1 111.5 162,7 32,6
\
7,8 26,5 60,4 38,0 55,64 10.1 58,1 20 ,8
1976 681,2 131,8 204,9 35,7 9.4 29,2 66,2 41,8 59,6 f  1.6 65,9 25,1
1977 856,0 111,8 349,2 40,3 15,1 32,3 73,5 51,6 67,4 .13,3 74,5 27,0
1978 1080.1 104,4 530,5 45,9 17,4 34,0 74,7 62,0 74.7 15,3 91,7 29,5
1979 1191,0 110,8 57,88 50,5 21,3 35,9 83,5 71.8 85,9 16,5 103,2 32,8
1980 1327.5 128,1 632,7 56,0 26,3 38,8 99,1 76,7 94,1 18,6 120 .0 37.1
Gross domestic fixed investment by kind of economic activity 
at current prices 
R millions
TOIAl
FIXED
INVESTMENT
Agricullurp*- 
and llshlng>>
Mining and 
quatiymg Manufacturing
Electricity 
and water
Construction
(contractors^
Wholesale and 
retail trade 
catering and 
accommodation^ -'
Transpon and 
commum- 
cationy
Finance, 
insurance 
leal estate and 
business services
Community, 
social and 
personal 
services^.
General
government
Other .>
producers"
1970 91.8 12,9 12,3 3,6 6.6 1.6 5.3 5.2 9,5 0,3 34,5 -
1971 125,1 12,4 6,0 3,6 20,6 2,0 5.4 6,9 11.0 0.4 56,8 -
1972 131.3 13.7 10,6 3,7 23,2 2.0 5.4 9,0 9.4 0.4 53,9 -
1973 138,5 16,3 17,2 3.7 18,2 2.1 4.4 9.2 7.7 1.7 58,0 -
1974 197,9 17.7 56,7 3.8 16,0 2.6 7,0 13,5 13,0 1.8 65,8 -
1975 326,5 18,0 118,3 4.2 32,7 3,5 15,5 17.1 16,7 1.9 98,6 •
1976 328,7 18,1 97,6 4.0 55,0 3 2 6.4 18,2 15,1 2,7
(
108,4 -
1977 302,6 19,3 76,2 5,7 46,0 3.1 4,1 20,2 10,0 1.1 116,9 -
1978 300,7 20,4 86,7 7,1 19,7 2.8 5.1 25,2 10,9 1.5 121,3 -
1979 340,8 21,5 52,5 7,8 14,7 3,6 9.5 26,7 16,4 2.4 185,7 -
1980 419,6 20,5 112,4 15,2 14.1 4.6 12,0 25,9 21,2 3.7 190,0 -
i
i
T
T
T
Distribution of national income 
R millions
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Remuneration of employees 150,8 170,5 189,1 213,4 247.1 283,1 332,1 375,8 419,0 470,2 550,8
Income from property by households 42.8 26,4 28,2 63,0 70,6 84,0 127,7 108,0 63,9 28,9 130,8
Corporate saving -4,6 14.7 68,7 95,9 39,3 64,3 28,1 95,3 146,7 193,5 203,6
Direct taxes on companies 55,0 46,1 29,4 52,3 75,7 63,6 56,1 80,4 150,7 176,9 185,4
Income from property by general 
government
1.0 0.8 2.3 1,5 2.1 *2.9 3.7 4,8 16,8 12,2 5.0
Less Interest on public debt 0.2 0.3 0.5 * 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0,8 1.3 1.8 5,0
Net national income 244,8 258,2 317,2 425,6 434,3 491,5 547,2 , 663,5 795,8 879,9 1070.6
Net domestic product at factor cost 299,8 304,2 366,2 476,6 492,3 546,8 636,5 803,9 1021.8 1125,3 1254.9
less Net factor payments to the lest of the 
world
55,0 46,0 49,0 ' 51,0 58,0 55,3 89,3 140,4 226,0 245,4 184.3
Net national product at factor cost 244,8 258,2 317,2 425,6 434,3 491,5 547,2 663,5 795,8 879.9 1070,6
Current income and expenditure 
of general government 
R millions
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Income from property 1.0 0,8 2,3 1.5 2.1 *2.9 3,7 4,8 16,8 12,2 5,0
less Interest on public debt 0.2 0.3 0,5 0,5 0,5 0.6 0.5 0,8 1.3 1.8 5,0
Indirect taxes 27,7 33.6 33,6 40,3 47.7 46,9 60,2 97,0 106,6 121,3 118,6
Direct taxes 60,6 53.1 37,9 63,1 89,6 89,0 83,7 110,4 189,4 214,0 229,0
Current transfers received from  
households
Transfers received from the rest of the 
world
CURRENT INCOME
1.2
17,8
1.0
17,9
1.1
25,5
1,3
31,1
1.5
26,9
1.5
37,5
1.7
51,7
1.7
55,0
1.8
91,9
1.9
52,3
1.9
78,4
108.1 106.1 99,9 136,8 167,3 171,4 200,5 3.68,1 405,2 399,9 427,9
Consumption expenditure 47.2 51,2 58,9 72,7 84.2 95.9 108,2 121,7 147,6 184,2 215,6
Subsidies 5.9 6,1 6,9 7.1 5,5 4.4 6.3 5.4 17,6 19,5 20,0
Current transfers to households 4.5 4,9 3,7 8,3 6.4 8.4 10,6 11.2 14.1( 18.7 19,3
Transfers to the rest of the world 2.9 3,3 3,9 3.2 1.6 0,7 0,5 0,5 0,3 0,3 0.4
CURRENT EXPENDITURE 60,5 65,5 73,4 91,3 97,7 109,4 125,6 138,8 179,6 222,6 255,3
SAVING 47,6 40,6 26,5 45,5 69,6 62,0 74,9 129,3 225,6 177,3 172,6
Final expenditure by the general government 
R millions
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Remuneration of employees 28.6 33.5 38,3 43,8 49,9 54,0 61.1 68,8 85,3 95,5 111,0
Provision for depreciation 2,0 2,4 2,8 t 3.2 3,7 4,1 4,8 5,6 6,5 7,7 9,0
Gross value added 30.6 35,9 41.1 47,0 53,6 58,1 65,9 74,5 91,7 103,2 120,0
Intermediate consumption 24.1 24,9 29.2 40,3 47,6 59,5 65,5 68,2 81,3 108,0 134,4 *
less Sales and fees 7.5 9.6 11.4 14,6 17,0 21.7 23,2 21,0 25,4 27,1 38,8
i
Consumption expenditure 47.2 51,2 58,9 72,7 84,2 95,9 108,2 121,7 147,6 184,1 215,6
Residential buildings 5.2 8,7 6,2 5.8 8.1 14,6 13,7 13,3 13,7 13,1 13,9
Non-residential buildings 8,4 11.6 14,1 16.2 15,8 18,0 21,1 31,3 30,1 63,0 42,6
Construction works 20,9 36,5 33,6 36,0 41.9 66,0 73,6 72,3 77,5 109,6 133,5
Gross fixed investment 34,5 56,8 53,9 58,0 65,8 98,6 108,4 116,9 121,3 185,7 190,0
Total final expenditure 81,7 108,0 112,8 130,7 150,0 194,5 216,6 238,6 268,9 369,8 405,6
Fixed capital stock 292,8 347,1 398,2 453,1 515,1 609,6 713,2 824,5 939,2 1117,3 1298,2
íCurrent account of the balance of 
payments 
R millions
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Merchandise exports 240,0 204,0 282,0 377,0 407,0 353,2 425,4 694,0 827,8 948,6 1022,9
Merchandise imports 201,3 199,4 203,2 237,0 394,8 412,8 488,2 522,1 447,2 564,5 765,8
Trade balance 38,7 4.6 78.8
/
140.0 12,2 -59,6 -62.8 171,9 380,6 384,1 257,1
Net payments for non-factor services -22,0 -21,0 -25,0 -47,0 -51,0 -54,7 -63,0 -83,3 -60,9 -91,1 -129,2
Net exports of goods and non­
factor services
16,7 -16,4 53,8 93,0' -38,8 -114,3 -125,8 88,6 319,7 293,0 127,9
Net factor payments -55,0 -46,0 -49,0 -51,0 -58,0 -55,3 -89,3 -140,4 -226,0
f
-245,4 -184,3
Net transfer receipts 14,9 14,6 21,6 27,9 25,3 36,8 51,2 54,5 91,6 52,0 78,0
Balance on current account -23,4 -47,8 26,4 69.9 -71,5 -132,8 -163,9 2,7 185,3 99,6 21.6-
d
/
111 '
E  ____________
vi
i
.Selected economic indicators
.
UNIT 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1970 1977 1978 1979 1S80 1981
G E N E R A L  S A L E S  T A X R mill. - . . - . . . . 8.2 31,8 39.3
T R A N S F E R  D U TY R m ill. 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.1 0.6 0.8 1.3 1,2 3,4
R E T A IL  S A L E S R mill. • . . . 217.9 217.4 241.9 264,2
W H O L E S A L E  S A L E S R mill. . ■ . . . 198,3 235.0 342.7 406,6 490,9
C O N S U M E R  P R IC E  IN D E X - W in d h o e k 66.9 70.7 74.5 80,4 88,6 100,0 111.8 125.8 139,8 157.6 177.3 203,5
F O O D  P R IC E  IN D E X - W in d h o e k 60,1 62.2 67.4 78,6 88,8 100.0 107,1 121.4 138,5 155,6 177,6 224.8
T O N - K IL O M E T R E S  T R A N S P O R T E D  B Y  S A R mill, t-km ■ ■ . . 6000 5844 6489 6970 7113 5815 6360 6210 6681
B U IL D IN G  P L A N S  P A S S E D  (p r iv a te  sector):
W in d h o e k  , . . 12.195 11.682 12.148 5717 4004 5782 3309 12.551 14.299 24.600
K ee tm ansh o o p • . . . 193 497 177 259 348
S w ako p m u n d • . 1748 2467 62 /6
O kaha nd ja • • • • 190 5026
G obab is • • 756
T sum eb . . i
854
O tjiw a ro n g o • • 475
B U IL D IN G S  C O M P L E T E D  (p r iv a te  secto r): R ’000 , i
W in d h o e k . . • . 6517 4919 10.633 16.288 4560 2043 2493 1828 4346 12.902
K ee tm ansh o o p
"N
. 237 - 38 51 128 224
S w ako p m u n d • • 3300
O kaha nd ja
G obab is • • 180
Tsum eb • . , ■ 95
O tjiw a ro n g o
'
129
vi 
i 
i
a -
NOTES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Statistical/Economic Review, Department of Finance, Windhoek, 
1982 and D. M u d g e 1s 1982 Budget Speech cited in Star 
(Johannesburg), 29-V-82 as reporting 11.3% agricultural and 
12.4% mining output falls in 1981.
See, eg Namibia in the 1980's, Catholic Institute for Inter­
national Relations, London, 1981; R.H. Green From Sudwestafrika 
to Na mi bi a, research report no. 58, Scandinavian Institute of 
African Studies, Uppsala, 1981; R.H. Green, K. Kiljunen and 
M-L. Kiljunen, Namibia: The Last Colony, Longmans, 1981 and 
SWAPO, To Be Born A Nation: The Liberation Struggle for N a m i b i a , 
Zed Press, London, 19bl.
See "Namibia", ACR 1980-81; Financial T i m e s , 3-II-82; Inter­
national Herald Tribune, l-VII-82.
See R.H. Green and J. de la Paix, "A Nation In Agony: The 
Namibian People's Struggle for Solidarity, Freedom and Justice", 
Development Dialogue, 1982-1.
See ibid especially on Botha meeting with Namibian church 
leaders.
ibid.
Partly derived from Statistical/Economic Review and partly 
from R. Moorsom, Agriculture in Namibia (publication pending).
Estimates vary widely but all show a sharp fall. This one 
appeared in ll-XII-81 Windhoek Advertiser.
Financial Ti m e s , 19-11-81.
Cited by Moorsom.
Eg, S t a r , 20-11-82, 17-IV-82; Windhoek Observer 24-IV-82;
Rand Daily M a i l , 15-XII-81.
Cf "Will SA settle in SWA", B. Pogrund Rand Daily M a i l ,
19-IV-82.
SWAPO broadcast, Addis Ababa, 4-1-82; de facto confirmed 
6-1-82 Windhoek by SWAWEK general manager reporting resumption 
of service.
Cited Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 19-VI-81.
Estimated from De Beers Annual Reports.
Diamond tax revenue has fallen from nearly R200 million in the 
late 1970's to an estimated R35 million for 1982-83.
Statistical/Economic Review and FM, 19-VI-81.
i b i d .
"SWA economic performance tops", Windhoek Advertiser, 19-XII-8C: 
Astonishing Growth", FM, 12-XII-80.
- b -
20 "Department of Finance looks at the Economy", WO, 20-XII-80.
21 An attitude which comes through clearly in the Annual Reports 
and in the policy statements on non-racial training, housing, 
wages clearly aimed at present (eg Botswana) and future
(eg Namibia) African decision takers.
22 Statistical/Economic Review.
23 Eg Pogrund ojd cit and "SWA's trick aparthied" 26-IV-82.
24 eg Weekly political column by G. Lister.
25 Eg cited in WO, 20-111-82.
26 At Geneva Pre-implementation Conference, January 1981.
27 Since South Africa began to raise "linkage" issue.
28 Rebuilding livestock herds, proving new mineral deposits and 
opening new mines clearly will not take place prior to a 
firm political settlement.
29 Statistical/Economic Review, op ci t.
30 Green and Kiljunens, 0£  c i t .
31 This depends on the level of deferred taxes being provided.
In 1979 85% of the total was CDM and only 15% Rossing. 
Estimated from De Beers and RTZ Annual Reports.
32 Statistical/Economic Review, op ci t.
33 Guestimated from price data in ib id.
34 Notable in licenced building plans and completions for late 
19 79 on, as reported in ib id.
35 From ibid - the exact basis of estimation is not clear, but 
seems to be historic cost less straight line depreciation.
36 Excluding Walvis Bay.
37 Including Walvis Bay.
38 But data on cattle stock falls in ibid suggest 1982 level 
R110-150 million.
39 Statistical/Economic Review, op c i t .
40 Computed from comparison of 1975 Constant Price and Current 
Price series in ibid.
41 In ib id.
42 Cf Green and Kiljunens, 0£  ci t.
43 Statistical/Economic Review, op c i t .
44 ibid.
45 See "Namibia", ACR, 1979-80, 1980-81.
- c -
4 6 Moorsom, ojd c i t .
47 Statistical/Economic Review, op c i t ; F M , 19-VI-81, 0£  c i t .
48 These are largely import and excise duty pool shares - not 
apparently recomputed on a much more generous (and realistic) 
formula than previously.
49 Computed from 1981 de Beers Annual Re po rt, Kimberley.
50 RTZ 1981 Annual Report, London
51 Statistical / Economic Review, op ci t.
52 Ib i d .
5 3 Ibid.
54 Rough guess, separate data are not kept by Reserve Bank of 
South Africa.
55 Computed from Statistical/Economic Review, op c i t .
56 Either major re-estimation of imports of exciseables was 
carried out, or a 42% markup analagous to that applying to 
SACUA members (the B-L-S states) was instituted, or both.
57 FM, 19-VI-81.
58 M u d g e 's 1982-83 Bidget Speech, cited in Star 19-V-82.
59 Ib i d .
60 FT, 3-II-82.
61 I H T , l-VII-82.
62 Derived from RDM 25-111-82,
63 Assuming at least 30% of defence expenditure proper and 10%
of other security/police spending is in Namibia.
64 Cited in Green and de la Paix, ojd ci t.
65 See "A SWAPO camp that looks to the future", R D M , 8-III-82.
66 See "Namibia", A C R , 1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81 for discussion
of SWAPO Programme.
67 Ojd cit.
68 Zed Press, London, 1981.
69 Eg Washington P o s t , 7-X-81.
70 Herald (then Salisbury, now Harare), 10-XI-81.
71 Ibid.
72 Post, ojd c i t .
Source of Tables: Statistical/Economic Review, Department-of 
Finance, Windhoek, 1982.
